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To spread psychological insight, Kahneman once tried to add a course on judgment to Israel’s school curriculum.
为了传播心理学洞见，卡尼曼曾试图在以色列的学校课程中增加一门关于判断力的课程。
He expected the project would take a year or two.
他预计这个项目需要一到两年的时间。
It took eight, by which time the ministry of education had lost enthusiasm; a humbling example of what he and Amos Tversky, his frequent co-author, called the “planning fallacy”.
最后花了8年，那时教育部已经失去了热情，这也是他和阿莫斯·特沃斯基（他们经常一起写书）所说的“规划谬误”的一个令人汗颜的例子。
He had more success inveigling psychological wisdom into the well-guarded realm of economics, which had clung to a thin but tidy model of human decision-making.
他更大的成就是将心理学智慧巧妙地引入了戒备森严的经济学领域，经济学之前一直墨守一种单薄但条理清晰的人类决策模型。
How did he do it?
他是怎么做到的？
One answer is that he teamed up with Tversky, whose elegant mind was as ruthlessly tidy as his desk.
一个答案是他与特沃斯基进行了合作，特沃斯基的清晰头脑就像他的办公桌一样极度整洁。
They incorporated the cognitive illusions they had discovered into a model called “prospect theory”.
他们将他们发现的认知错觉纳入了一个名为“前景理论”的模型中。
According to this theory, people’s well-being responds to changes in wealth, more than levels.
根据这一理论，人们的幸福感因财富的变化而非财富水平的高低而变化。
The changes are judged relative to a neutral reference point.
财富的变化相对于一个中性参考点来进行判断。
That point is not always obvious and can be recast: a bonus can disappoint if it is smaller than expected.
这个点并不总是显性的，而且可以被更改：如果奖金比预期的少，那么就算拿奖金可能也会令人失望。
In pursuit of gains, people are risk averse.
在追求收益的过程中，人们会规避风险。
They will take a sure win of $450 over a 50% chance of winning $1,000.
他们会选择稳稳当当地赢450美元，而不是赌50%的概率去赢1000美元。
But people gamble to avoid losses, which loom larger than gains of an equivalent size.
但为了避免损失，人们也会冒风险赌运气，损失比等量的收益显得更突出。
Prospect theory translated this model of decision-making from vignettes into the language of algebra and geometry.
前景理论将这种决策模式从小故事翻译成了代数和几何的语言。
That made it palatable to economists.
这就使得这种模式很合经济学家的口味。
Indeed, the discipline began to claim this sort of thing as its own.
事实上，经济学开始声称这类模型就是经济学的模型。
Applications of psychology “came to be called behavioural economics”, lamented Kahneman, “and many psychologists discovered that the name of their trade had changed even if its content had not.
卡尼曼悲叹道，心理学在经济学中的应用“后来被称为行为经济学，许多心理学家发现，他们的职业名称已经改变，虽然内容并没有什么变化” 。
Even as economics was rebranding psychology, Kahneman revived an older economic tradition: “hedonimeters”, gauges of pleasure and pain that Francis Edgeworth, a 19th-century economist, had imagined.
就在经济学给心理学改名换姓的时候，卡尼曼复兴了一个更古老的经济学传统：“快乐度量计”，这是19世纪经济学家弗朗西斯·埃奇沃斯想象的测量快乐和痛苦的工具。
Kahneman’s hedonimeter simply asked people to rate their feelings moment-to-moment on a scale.
卡尼曼的快乐度量计只是简单地让人们在一个量表上对自己每时每刻的感受进行评分。
He found that people’s ratings were often at odds with what they later recalled.
他发现，人们的评分往往与他们后来的回忆不符。
Their “remembering” selves put undue weight on the end of an experience and its best or worst moment, neglecting its duration.
他们“回忆”中的自我过分重视体验的结束时刻，以及其中最好或最坏的时刻，而忽略了体验的持续时间。
People would rather keep their hand in painfully cold water for 90 seconds than for a minute, if the final 30 seconds were a little less cold than the preceding 60.
如果最后30秒的水温比之前的60秒稍微没有那么冷，人们就宁愿把手在冷水中放90秒，而不是放一分钟。
Likewise, people sign up for hectic tourist itineraries because they look forward to looking back on them, not because they much enjoy them at the time.
同样，人们报名参加繁忙的旅游行程，是因为他们期待日后回顾这些行程，而不是因为他们当时玩得很开心。
The implications of this discovery extend into philosophy.
这一发现的影响延伸到了哲学领域。
Which self counts?
哪一个自我才算数？
Despite its manifest flaws, the curatorial self, artfully arranging unrepresentative memories into a life story, is dear to people.
尽管这些策划有明显的缺陷，但策划一切的自我巧妙地将不具代表性的点滴记忆组合成一个人生故事，从而依然受到人们的喜爱。
“I am my remembering self,” Kahneman wrote, “and the experiencing self, who does my living, is like a stranger to me.”
“我是我回忆中的自我，”卡尼曼写道，“而体验一切的自我虽然过着我的生活，但对我来说就像一个陌生人。”
Now his experiencing self has done its living.
现在，他的体验自我已经过完了他的一生。
And it is up to the many people he touched to do the remembering for him.
该由那些因他而受到触动的许多人来替他完成对人生的回忆了。
